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lo: 
Knowledge of Atoms and Void in Epicureanism 
D. J. Furley 
(A revised version of a paper read at the 
Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy 
at Boston in December 1967.) 
There is an obvious paradox in the theories of the Atomists. They held 
that nothing exists but atoms and void, and that the atoms are imperceptibly 
small, and invariant in quality. The thinking part of a man is composed of 
these materials and no others; his thinking can only be a function of the 
motions of invariant atoms. Knowledge of the external world must be some kind 
of reaction between the atoms of the external world and the atoms of the thinking 
man; and the only reaction in the atomist's theory is simply collision. That 
is to say, the connexion between the thinking subject and the external world is 
nothing but touch: utactus enim, tactus, pro divum numina sancta" as Lucretius 
strenuously insists (2. 434). The Atomists are then ready to show how all our 
senses are really varieties of the sense of touch; each faculty of sense is 
stimulated by actual contact with suitable formations of atoms proceeding from 
the external world. 
It is a picture which has a certain plausibility as a theory of sensation. 
And the atomists liked to say that sensation is indeed the basis for all our 
contact with the external world. The paradox of course is this: if knowledge 
comes to us by means of sensation, how are we to explain the atomist1s knowledge 
of the bas�c propositions of his special theory: that the world consists of 
void, which is called "the intangible", and atoms, which are said to be 
imperceptibly small? It is a question which arises with regard to the earlier 
Atomists and t he Postaristotelians; but this paper deals only with the latter. 
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One answer to the question has acquired authority during the last few 
decades of classical scholarship, and I want first to examine it. Its best 
known statement is in the work on Epicurus by Cyril Bailey.1 According to 
Bailey, the Epicureans believed in a form of direct Jmowledge of the external 
world which by-passed sense perception. It was a sort of focussing of the 
mind analogous to focussing the eyes, straining the ears, dilating the nostrils 
(and presumably doing whatever one does do to the tongue and the skin for the 
other two senses). 
Bailey correctly drew attention2 to a striking difference in what Epicurus 
said about the two classes of subjects which he grouped together under the 
heading adela (non-evident). Meteorology and the stars were one such class; 
Epicurus asserted that since we cannot get the close view and since many 
explanations of the same phenomenon are often equally in conformity with our 
observations, the philosopher must hold all these explanations to be equally 
true. To prefer one to the others, he said, would be to plunge into mythology.3 
And everybody knows that the Epicureans exhibited something like relish in 
offering multiple explanations for these things.4 
However, the fundamental principles of the atomic theory, such as the 
statement that there exist atoms, that there is void, that there is no third 
sort of being, and so on - - these are also ��' in that they are not accessible 
to direct sense-perception. But in this case, the Epicureans accepted no 
multiple explanations: just one theory was right, and one could accept it 
confidently. 
What was the Epicureans' justification for this certainty? Bailey thought 
he had found the answer in the expression used by Epicurus with some frequency 
but without definition: "epibole te!s dianoias". I quote from Bailey:5 
\ 
11Thought -- or reasoning 
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about the ultimate realities of the world is 
conducted by the comparison and combination of "clear" concepts, each stage 
in the process being a new concept recognized as self-evident. Thes e concepts 
are grasped by 'an act of appre hension on the part�of the mind' (epibole tes 
dianoias) exactly similar to that by which the senses apprehend the 'clear 
vision' of the near object, or the mind the subtle images which penetrate to 
it." 
This assertion was defended in a long appendix on epibole tes dianoias 
which Bailey put at the end of both of his books on Epicurus. 
Striking use of Bailey's explanation was made by Cornford, in the second 
chapter of his Principium Sapientiae, where he attacks the verdict of some 
�riters that Epicureanism was one of the most "scientific11 of ancient philo-
6 sophical systems. Cornford says: "A system which professes to rest on the 
testimony of the infallible senses might be expected to put forward only a 
tentative hypothesis about the wholly imperceptible, and to recommend suspension 
of judgment • • •  Bu t Epicurus' attitude is exactly the reverse of this sceptical 
caution: he is more dogmatic in this field than in either of the other two • 
'Atomism is not one among several possible theories of the universe, nor with 
regard to any of its details is there a hint that any other view than that 
expounded by Epicurus himself /could be true,' (Bailey � 265). Epicurus is 
content to assert roundly that his atomism is the only theory consistent with 
phenomena.11 
A curious feature of this appreciation of Epicurus is the way in which it 
ignores some of the evidence, and distorts the reste "How did Epicurus suppose 
we come by our knowledge of atoms and the void?" Bailey asks. But he does not 
look for the answer in the obvious place: namely, in the text in whic h Epicurus 
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defends his basic propositions. Instead he seizes upon the obscure phrase 
7 epibole tes dianoias and manipulates the contexts in which it appears until 
they seem to justify his theory of direct mental apprehension. 
It must be conceded first that the notion of direct mental apprehension 
� play a part in Epicureanism. What I want to deny is only that it plays 
the supremely important part in the foundations of the atomic theory that Bailey 
has given to it. 
There is enough textual evidence in Epicurus himself and Lucretius to show 
that the Epicureans held that certain eidola, of the same kind as the eidola 
which cause sense-perception, do not stimulate the senses, because they are too 
fine (leptos), but rather penetrate directly to the soul-atoms of the mind.
8 
There they may produce a phantasia or image, which is similar to the images 
produced by sensation. The experiences which the Epicureans hoped to explain 
by this thesis were dream-visions, certain types of imagination (in the modern 
sense), and especially ideas about the gods. 
The texts which serve as our evidence for this theory do not speak of the 
fundamental propositions about atoms and the void. It is my belief that this 
theory was strictly limited to the explanation of those experiences with which 
it is associated in the surviving texts. 
The inflation of epibole tes dianoias into a kind of intuitive knowledge 
which includes knowledge of the fundamental propositions of atomism can be 
punctured by the study 
place: that is, it is 
Herodotus, 
§ 50-51, in 
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But the error would not have h::i ppened if we did not heve 
a second •;1oti_on, in ourselves, connected with the Pppre-
hension of t�e i��?e, but different from it; in this 
motion, if there is no confirmation, or refutation, 
error arises, and if there is conf irmP t ton or no refut­
ation, truth.13 
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Sentence A of this text is about reliable perception and mental apprehension. 
It might perhaps be thought that the word epibletikos mentions the necessary and 
sufficient condition for reliable perception; but this need not be so. The 
conditions for reliable perception are mentioned in·the clause beginning 
ginomene. Mental images (phantasiai) are reliable when they are produced by 
the successive repetition of the eidolon (that is, when a constant stream of 
eidola comes from the external object to the perceiver, as when one is directly 
looking at the object), or when they come about through what is left behind by 
the eidolon (that is, the pattern left behind as a memory by previous sense­
experience) .14 The word epibletikos means no more than "by the apprehensive 
process", the process by which the mind or the senses "get hold of" something. 
This is confirmed by a fragment of the lost work of Epicurus On Nature, where 
the epibletikos tropos is contrasted with "proceeding from oneself alone" 
(29.15.8). 
Sentences B, c, and D are all about illusion. This is the point missed by 
the editors, who believe that C is about reliable perception. The passage as a 
whole is telling us something essentially simple, and it runs like this: 
Sentence A (following a description of the eidola and their reception by 
the perceiver): The image that results from the apprehension of eidola, when 
it comes from a succession of eidola, not just a random one, or when it 
corresponds to a memory image, reproduces the shape of the external object 
which produced the eidola. 
Sentence B. Error is not in the act of apprehension, but in a subsequent 
movement of the soul, called �. 
Sentence C. The misleading resemb lance between dream-images and other 
. 
V' 
illusory appearances15 on the one hand and what is true and real on the other 
• 
-8 -
the resemblance which leads into the error of supposing that the illusion is 
the truth -- exists because illusory images, as well as reliable images, are 
produced by the apprehension of real eidola (real eidola, we have to understand, 
but not in a steady succession).16 
Sentence D. Error occurs when such an image is wrongly assessed by � 
the "second rr.otion" (.!?.£. of soul atoms) "in ourselves": it is treated as a 
clear image, resulting fr01n a steady stream of eidola, when it is not. 
Here, then, epibole tes dianoias occurs in the explanation of illusions 
of many kinds. This surely should have been enough to give Bailey pause. What 
kind of a concept is it that is � the explanation of illusory dreams an d 
visions, � the guarantee of scientific truth? If this phrase is to mean "an 
act of deliberate attention" is it not disconcerting to find it in an account 
of dreams? 
At this point we can turn to the other approach to Epicurus' idea of his 
knowledge of the atomic theory: that is, the method of argument used to defend 
it. First, it may be worth saying that Bailey and Cornford were probably 
distracted from this approach by the notion, which seems to me mistaken, that 
we must look for the distinguishing characteristics of an empirical theory in 
the manner in which the theory is first reached, rather than the manner in which 
it is defended. As against this, I agree with Popper, who wrote at the begin• 
ning of his Logic of Scientific Discovery, "The question of how a new idea 
occurs to a man • • •  may be of great interest to empirical psychology; but it 
is irrelevant to the logical analysis of scientific knowledge. 1117 
The relevant section of the Letter to Herodotus is preceded by a methodo­
logical not:e: "We mus.t contro! all our investigation by the sensations and by 
the immediate apprehensions (epibolai) either of the mind ,or the various other 
criteria, likewise by the immediate feelings, so that we can make inferences 
about that which is in suspense and about things which are unclear."18 
• 
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He continues at once: HAbout things that are unclear, we must get the 
following points made and keep them in mind. First that nothing comes to be 
out of that which does not exist; for everything would in that case be coming 
into being with no need of seeds." 
Notice the very simple method: he asserts his thesis, then makes its 
contradictory the protasis of a conditional statement, of which the apodosis is 
a proposition falsified by sense-perception. "P. For, if not-P, then Q, which 
ris observed to be false". 
We have very nearly the same pattern repeated frequently, and especially 
in the argument for the existence of void, which became famous and much talked 
about in antiquity -- indeed it was famous before Epicurus used it at all, for 
it was used in the reverse direction by the Eleatics, 19 and was almost certainly 
borrowed from them by Leucippus and Democritus.20 
First Epicurus notes that the existence of somata is confirmed by the 
direct evidence of the senses, "which we must use for making inferences about 
what is unclear by reasoning {logismos)". He goes on, 11 If there did not exist 
that which we call void and space and untouchable nature, bodies would have 
nowhere to be or to move, as they are observed to move.11 
The schema is this: "Void exists: for if void did not exist, there would 
be no motion, which we observe to be false.iv 
A century or more after Epicurus, when Stoic logic was developed into a 
systematic study, this pattern of inference was formalized and grouped with 
other similar patterns. It is in fact the second of the undemonstrated 
arguments collected by Benson Mates (Stoic Logic, p. 71): "If the first, then 
the second Not the second; therefore not the first,n with negative propo­
sitions substituted for the propositional variables. 
• 
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The Stoics, with their new interest in logic and epistemology, attacked the 
Epicureans. Although the Epicureans were probably never much interested in 
logic as such, they evidently felt impelled to offer some sort of reply to Stoic 
criticism. We have evidence of their replies in the Epicurean work by Philodemus , 
called On Signs, which partly survives in the form of badly mutilated papyrus 
fragments. It was published by Gomperz in the 1860s, and there was a further 
study of it by Philippson in 1909 and 1910, so there was no excuse for Bailey's 
total neglect of it in his books on Epicureanism; though of course he did not 
have the advantage of Professor DeLacy's edition of it. This book should at 
least be scrutinised for any evidence it may provide on the way the Epicureans 
thought about the epistemological basis of their theory. Like all the 
Herculaneum papyri which contain Epicurean material (at least, those so far 
unrolled and read), Philodemus' On Signs has very limited value. What it does 
show is that a debate went on about the validity of inductive inference. The 
Stoics, it appears, wanted a logic of science based on the model of Aristotelian 
apodeixis, in which only necessary truths would be admitted. Hence they claimed 
that the implicat ion "If there is motion, then there is void" was valid, only 
if it was contradictory to deny the second a nd assert the first; i.e. only if 
void were somehow involved in the definition of motion. The Epicureans replied 
with an insistence that the in�erence is empirical, not analytic. "We study 
all the things that move in our experience and we reckon up th e accompanying 
conditions, without which we see nothing move; and we claim that everything 
that moves, moves like these things, and so infer that there cannot be motion 
without void.1121 
Now, these Epicurean arguments are no doubt naive and lacking in scientific 
precision. But they do not, so far as I can see, suggest that knowledge of the 
proposition "there is void", and of the other basic proposition of the atomic 
• 
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theory, was thought to depend upon some kind of direct mental perception called 
epibole tes dianoias. Of course, the Stoics had a point when they said that the 
arguments which moved from instances in our experience to instances outside our 
experience depend on the assumption that there are uniformities in nature. But 
this is clearly only a weakness if you demand analytic truth in the realm of 
empirical knowledge. 
However let us look at some Epicurean arguments of a different type, where 
the appeal to sense-perception is less obvious. 
One example is the argument with which Epicurus supports his theory of 
22 to en te atomo elachiston, or minimae partes, as Lucretius calls them. There 
are other ways of reading this argument, but if I am right about it, it includes 
the following: Suppose that an atom contains infinitely numerous parts, each 
of them having size: it is impossible, in that case, to see how it can still be 
finite in size, since the parts must all be of some size, and if they are 
infinitely numerous, the total must be infinitely large. Hence we must not 
suppose that the atom is infinitely divisible. 
This argument contains the expression ouk esti noesai, "it cannot be 
thought1 , "it is impossible to see". Does this indicate some appeal to a kind 
of direct intuition? Are we perhaps supposed to make use of the epibole tes 
dianoias, and rely on its negative report: "It is not possible to see how a 
finite body can have infinitely numerous parts11.? 
No. Epicurus continues at once with an appeal to sense-perception. There 
is a minimum visible quantity: one cannot -- experience shows that one cannot --
divide a visible area into infinitely numerous parts. We must believe that the 
sub-visible area, which is accessible only to the theorising mind, follows the 
same pattern as the visible one. 
-12-
It is interest ing that there are two analogies in this argument, one of 
which is supposed to hold while the other is not. Epicurus uses the analogy 
between the visible and the intelligible: he regards this as valid. But we 
might suppose that there is likewise an analogy between the minimum and 
multiples of the minimum in the visible field, and conclude that because we 
can distinguish parts of something that is larger than the minimum we must 
be able to distinguish parts of the minimum itself , since it is the same kind 
of stuff. This analogy obviously has to be rejected. Epicurus goes on at 
once to reject another one:if we say the atom has parts, we might be tempted to 
think that it could be resolved into its parts like compound bodies in the 
sensible range: but this again is obviously false . The reason why the analogy 
can be seen to be invalid on both these cases is just that the conclusion yielded 
by the analogy has already been falsified by another argument. We know already 
that there is a minimum visible quantity, and that atoms are indissoluble. 
This passage may perhaps throw some light on another part of the Letter 
to Herodotus: an obs cure remark which Bailey used as the main prop to support 
his argument about epibole tes dianoias .
23 
The subject is this. Epicurus has just asserted that atoms moving in the 
void all move at the same speed, in whatever direction they are moving. Compound 
bodies, however, are seen to move at different speeds. How can this be? The 
answer is that though the compound appears to move all in a solid mass, it is 
in reality composed of atoms and void, and within its surfaces its component 
atoms � moving to and fro in all directions all at constant speed. The speed 
of motion of a compound body depends on the overall direction taken by its 
component atoms during a stretch of time . Now, suppose we have a compound 
moving from A to B, a distance of one metre, in 100 seconds . Then all its 
component atoms have moved one metre in that direction in 100 seconds. It is 


)7?1E 5'; 28,,'3; 56; ; 9-"E 82.3E #(:3; -*E &&!+ )E 97E
4:/)E $; -+E 2)&; )&; # $94E *E )$; ;):E );  2)&; )E 2*; -)E
'$+ 5"+ A->E ; !3; ; BE 9E <E 6%	!69E <&,94@6E 	; 
<-$E
'DE ; (0@)E *E ,DE 59-*E C=@4E
3; #+ AE , 8/92; +%"84; 7; -
01.;
Y^ T;^ /?8!9]",WFQ:R^ -A<'^ 	+ 	
  + &^ 8V^ %^
6U7L^  >3M4G^ 0^ JNZ[D^ ^ #2=B^ \5K(O^ 1I^ 
	XC^
@'^Mh:(y)h*  + "q  r  A+  NhOP_)  i,`  B 
C-  Qe(  Rh)za  C]  j  .  .Sk*#  sj`  )+ f)l 
+ d)q{/R`  S)**^ `r  |1Nj  L   qnTlU 
+ gsVsh  !  DW!E   tF2}3$  ( *
+ o(~!-uXGb*  %+
).H$@P +E^ R  ;c)  + H  45   I6*  <q{  7.
JYj>  A  N  %Z(&  r  ?y	
v.&    \  y9 
.. 
- 14 -
Bailey seizes upon this statement because it appears to say that epibole 
tes dianoias is infallible. He makes the statement into an entirely general 
one by taking theoroumenon to mean "that which is grasped by the senses when 
'looking' at the close view"; thus he makes it a general statement of the two 
sources of knowledge according to his view of Epicureanism: the close view, 
and the direct mental apprehension. But in fact theoroumenon must mean studied: 
the word has occurred 16 words before, precisely to distinguish what is studied 
theoretically from what is observed by the senses. Whatever this concluding 
sentence says, it is all about thought. However, it still appears to say that 
the processes of thought are infallible. The contribution of � is false, 
since what is grasped by thought is true. "Why is � liable to produce false 
results, while the other (epibole) can only give us what is true?" Bailey 
24 asks; and he answers, "with some hesitation", that it is because the mind 
moves by one epibole after another, from one clear and distinct concept to 
another, each of these concepts being clear in the same technical sense as that 
in which the unimpeded view of a near object is clear. 
I think the clue to understanding this cryptic sentence of Epicurus lies 
25 
in the passage quoted above. What we have in both passages is a contrast 
between the operation of �' and the epibole of the senses or the mind . The 
important thing is to realise the exact nature of the contrast. Bailey takes 
it to mean that � goes wrong, whereas epibole is always right. But we have 
seen in the earlier passage that epibole is responsible for dreams and 
illusions, as well as for truth-telling apprehensions. The point of the 
contrast is that when we experience a mental image, it always pictures 
accurately the eidolon or set of eidola which cause it. Error never arises 
because of a lack of correspondence between the mental picture and the 
.. 
- 15 -
ato'.Itic configuration which caused it. The possibility 0£ error (<.rnd of being 
right, too, we ought to add) arises only at the second stage, when �' a 
second movement of the mind , distinct from the epibole, pronounces upon the 
relation between the mental picture and the external world. 
Epicurus should not use the word alethes of the primary impressions of 
the senses or the mind. It would be better to say they are neither true nor 
false. But it is quite clear that he does use alethes in this sense, since 
he is quoted as saying that ''the illusions (phantasmata) of madmen and dream-
visions are true11• The explanation is added : "they are true because they 
move ( h ff ) d h d . d ,. 26 t e su erer , an w at oes not exist oes not cause movement • 
So I suggest that Epicurus is not saying, as Bailey thought , 
that �·s inference from the seen to the unseen in this case is wrong, 
whereas the inference of JWibole to the unseen is always right : he is saying 
that it must be �·s inference to the unseen that is wrong in these cases, 
because the error never lies in the mental picture itself. He is not saying 
that direct mental apprehension infallibly tells the truth about the external 
world, but only that our mental images are not the level at which mistakes 
occur. 
So, what are we left with? 
An examination of all the evidence, of which the greater part has been 
discussed here, offers no ground for accepting Bailey's view of Epicurus.
27 
Epicurus did not claim to have son1e kind of direct insight which led to clear 
and distinct ideas about the structure of the world. He tried to present 
arguments for his basic propositions, based on the evidence of sense-
perceptiono Admittedly, his arguffients were extremely simple minded, for the 
most part. But I do not see any fundamental inconsistency in his position. 
- 16 -
In particular, he is not liable to the charge laid agains t him by Cornford, 
that he dogmatically ruled out multiple explanations in his atomic theory, 
while accepting them in his meteorology. His method was to s et up a pair of 
contradictories -- either there is void or there is not, either matter is 
infinitely divisible or it is not -- and then to present an argument for 
rejecting one of them. 
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12 h SS h �po'r a" (or o") B�,, • T e �If ave " " r a1\.1\.ot:,Ev. 
TCpoO'f3a.A.)\.op,Evu: w l th Use ner. I have R dopt e d the emendPtion of 
Schneider, followe d alse by Ar riph etti. 
Rre supplie� here bv Pll 
recent edit ors from 50, 11-12, where they are pr ob:=ibly mj_spleced. 
14. "T he remaining ef fect 1 1 (�y1ia-ra:Aciµµa) is mysterious. There 
is no doubt tbat in EpicureBn th eory the eidola leRve some mark 
on tbe soul Btoms nresumAbly some more or less durAble DF1ttern 
of ''!'.lot j_o n. This is probably what ey1ia-ra:AEtµµa refers to (al-
though there have be en other interpretations of it). It would 
take to o much space to ext=imine the possibilities fully. I be­
lieve Epicurus is thinking of the role of TCpo:Ar)11"t S in his theory 
of knowledge. See further Bailey GAE 245-47; K. Kleve, Gnosis 
� 
Theon (Oslo; Symbo lae Osloenses Fasc. Supplet. XIX, 1963) 23-29; 
D. J. Furley, Two S t ud ies in the 0-reek Atomi.sts ('P:r>i_nceton Unlver-
sity Press, 1967 ) 202-08. 
15. There is much obscurity in "the appearances seen as if in a 
pi_c tu re (EV d 1iOvi ) • 11 Gentaurs, Scvllas, nerherus es, PS in 
Lucretius 4, 732-33? 
16e Wote the similar argument in Lucreti us 4, 750-51 : 11qw:itenus 
hoc s irni le est i lli, qu od mente videmus/ a tque ocu li s, simi l:l 
fieri rr-itione necessest.11 And 757-59 "nee rPtion e Rlia, cum 
somnus membra orofudit;/ mens Animi vigilat, nisi quod simulAcra 
lacessunt/ haec ead em nostr�s anime1s quae cum vigilamus.11 
T he occurrenc e of this in Lucretius is a str�mg confJrrnation thAt 
we are n ow interpreting C corre c tly . 
17 .. Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London, 
Hutchinson, 1959 ) 31. 
18. Her. 3R, 3-70 The text 1s �isuuted, hut none of the v�ri-
20 
ations nroposed would �ffect the oresent discussion. 
19. Melissus B 7o7. 
20. Leucippus A 7 (Aristotle GC 325 a 4). 
21. VIII 32 - IX 3 (p. 42). Lucretius' wav of ha nc1lin,ci: this 
argument i s  interestinp.:. In 1, 370- 9 7 , he gives reasons for r e-
jecting the proposition that there� be motion Without void. 
The s econd s eems the bette r �rqument: if two flat bodies are in 
contact, surface to surfµce, and are then separated suddenly, then 
if . ,_, a voia space is impossible the air must fill th e newly 
created ryap instentaneously. 
22 a Her. 56-59. 
tbe Greek Atcmists 7-43 for a defence o f  the expl!:lnation given here. 
23. Her. 62. 
24. GAE 569-70. 
24a. I am grateful to Father T. J. Tracy, S. J., for some helpful 
comments on t his pas sage. 
25. �- 50-51. 
26. Diogenes Laertius 10, 32. Rather than chiding Epicurus for 
misusing alethes, I ought rather to say that the Greek wor ditself 
is not strictly equ:tvalent to the English word 11true11• See t he 
article b�r E. Heitsch, "Die nicht-ph ilosophische ci.Anesia. 11, 
Hermes 90, 1962, 24-33, and the bibliography cited there. There 
have been some int ere sting studies of Plqto's use of &.A�ens -
H. D. Rankin, "�A • .An0Eta in PlAto,11 Glotta 41, 1963, 51-54 ; 
s. :Pernµrdete, 11The Rip.ht, the '1'1rue qnd the -qe!:lutiful,n l}lotta 
41, 1963, 54-62; Go Vlastos, "Degrees of Reality in PlPto" in 
New Es spys on Plato 1=:1 nd Aris t ot le (London, Routledge 1965) 1-19. 
27. Other relevqnt nQssaP'es Are Per� 35 qnfl 38, KD x:av, J'..Tpt. 
- . -
29, 14-15. 
